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Abstract
Understanding how humans differ from other animals, as well as how we are like them, requires
comparative investigations. For the purpose of documenting the distinctive features of humans, the
most informative research involves comparing humans to our closest relatives–the chimpanzees
and other great apes. Psychology and anthropology have maintained a tradition of empirical
comparative research on human specializations of cognition. The neurosciences, by contrast, have
been dominated by the model-animal research paradigm, which presupposes the commonality of
"basic" features of brain organization across species and discourages serious treatment of species
differences. As a result, the neurosciences have made little progress in understanding human brain
specializations. Recent developments in neuroimaging, genomics, and other non-invasive
techniques make it possible to directly compare humans and nonhuman species at levels of
organization that were previously inaccessible, offering the hope of gaining a better understanding
of the species-specific features of the human brain. This hope will be dashed, however, if
chimpanzees and other great ape species become unavailable for even non-invasive research.
Introduction
What a pleasure it is to read Karl Pribram's 1970 James
Arthur Lecture on human specializations of the brain and
cognition [1]. It takes us back to a time of bold scientific
conjectures about human nature, an era that saw the pub-
lication of Konrad Lorenz's On Aggression (1966; first Ger-
man edition, 1963) [2], B.F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and
Dignity (1971) [3], and E.O. Wilson's Sociobiology (1975)
[4], to take a few examples, all books that intrigued me
(and sometimes infuriated me) as a student. Pribram dis-
plays an impressively broad knowledge of psychology and
neuroscience, achieving a synthesis that few scientists at
the time would have been capable of and that even fewer
scientists could credibly attempt today. The work is also
impressive because the author is reasonably specific about
what he considers to be the distinctive characteristics of
human beings. In the realm of cognition, he emphasizes
meaning, and in particular the ability of humans to con-
struct propositions. He doesn't quite claim that language
is a signature specialization of human cognition, but this
is implicit in his argument. He considers, for example,
that chimpanzees can use signs, but is not impressed with
their syntactic capacity. In the realm of neuroscience, Pri-
bram is less specific, but he does suggest that the distinc-
tiveness of the human brain involves not the organization
of cortico-cortical connections, as one might suppose, but
rather the organization of cortical connections with sub-
cortical motor structures, consistent with his view that
meaning is grounded in intention and action.
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How do Pribram's conjectures hold up in the light of
modern research? It must be acknowledged that Pribram's
lecture did not spark a new set of investigations into
human cognitive or neurological specializations. In the
1970s, comparative human-ape research was dominated
by the ape-language project, which involved teaching apes
(mainly chimpanzees) to communicate using systems of
manual gesture, such as American Sign Language, or with
physical tokens. Popular culture today takes it as given
that apes share with humans the capacity for language.
Students of language, however, have for the most part
drawn the opposite lesson from the ape-language project,
concluding that apes demonstrate little productive lan-
guage capacity, even after intensive training, and that lan-
guage is a human specialization (e.g., [5-12]). Recent
years have brought new ideas about human cognitive spe-
cializations. For example, Povinelli [13-15] has proposed
that unlike humans, chimpanzees do not form explicit
representations of abstract, unobservable variables, such
as mental states (in the case of behavioral causation) or
mass force (in the case of physical interactions). These
proposals have prompted much debate in the compara-
tive cognition community, along with new experiments
(to get the flavor of the debate, see Tomasello et al. [16]
and accompanying commentaries). It is noteworthy that
Povinelli's "reinterpretation" hypothesis [14,17,18],
which holds that humans create new causal interpreta-
tions of ancient behaviors, recalls Pribram's claim that
humans create and represent meaning through proposi-
tions. Additionally, anthropologists have revived the clas-
sical idea that culture is a human adaptation, and have
begun to characterize cognitive specializations involved
in the acquisition and transmission of cultural knowledge
(e.g., [19-21]).
What are the evolutionary specializations of the 
human brain?
While a thin but vital thread of research on human cogni-
tive specializations runs through psychology and anthro-
pology from the 1970s to the present, in the
neurosciences the thread has been drawn so fine as to be
nearly invisible. Consider Pribram's list of human brain
specializations: brain enlargement, hemispheric domi-
nance and specialization, and "somewhat more general-
ized" cytoarchitecture. Of these, brain enlargement
(encephalization) remains well accepted, although the
nature of this enlargement–was there a general enlarge-
ment or a more specific enlargement of association cor-
tex?–is controversial [22-26]. Whether humans show
greater hemispheric specialization than do apes and other
nonhuman primates is also controversial: there is some
evidence that our closest relatives, the chimpanzees and
other apes, possess homologues of Wernicke's and Broca's
areas, and that these are lateralized in ways that are at least
qualitatively similar to humans [27-30]. There are, how-
ever, those who maintain that humans show extreme
hemispheric asymmetry and functional laterality, and that
these are among the defining features of humans [31-33].
A few human specializations have been identified at finer
levels of structural organization. For example, the histo-
logical organization of human primary visual cortex dis-
plays some striking differences with apes and monkeys
[34]. Humans have several populations of morphologi-
cally and biochemically distinctive pyramidal cells in
anterior cortex [35-37]. The spacing and cell density of
minicolumns differ in Wernicke's area of the left and right
hemispheres in humans, but not in chimpanzees or mon-
keys [38]. With the extension of functional imaging tech-
niques to nonhuman primates has come evidence that the
functions of homologous visual areas differ to some
extent between humans and macaque monkeys (the ani-
mals most commonly used as models of the human visual
system), and also raise the possibility that humans have
several higher-order visual areas not present in monkeys
[39-41]. Unfortunately, there have not yet been functional
imaging studies of ape visual cortex, so it is not possible
to say whether these differences represent true human spe-
cializations or specializations of the larger group (the
Hominoidea) to which both humans and apes belong;
the possibility that differences represent specializations of
macaques also needs to be considered. One can point to
additional differences between humans and various
"model" species, such as human-macaque or human-
mouse differences–some of them quite remarkable [42]–
but as interesting and important as these differences
undoubtedly are, we cannot safely  conclude that these are
human specializations without studies that directly com-
pare humans to apes, as well as to other species.
What slim pickings! It seems extraordinary that neuro-
science has so little to offer on a matter so fundamental as
what is it about our brains that makes us human. No less
disturbing is the understanding that if we don't have the
information to say much about how our brains differ from
those of other animals, we probably know less than we
suppose about how humans resemble other animals, also.
Why do we know so little about human brain 
specializations?
How is it that after more than 125 years of experimental
neuroscience we know so little about how the human
brain differs from that of other species? Consider the kind
of research required to understand the place of humans
among animals: one would need studies that examine
human brain structure and function in detail, and that
compare humans to other species using comparable tech-
niques. The most informative comparisons, if one's goal is
to understand human specializations, are with the great
apes, and especially with chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:17 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/17
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and bonobos ("pygmy" chimpanzees; Pan paniscus), as
these are the animals most closely related to us. If one's
main goal is to understand what humans share with other
animals, comparative studies would still be essential,
although in this case one would need to study a broad
range of species, of varying degrees of relationship to
humans.
We do not have these kinds of studies. The obvious reason
for this is it has been difficult to study the human brain
directly in much detail. Historically, the most valuable
investigative techniques in the neurosciences have
required invasive and terminal techniques, or other
manipulations (such as genetic manipulations) that we
regard as unethical in humans. So, for the most part, neu-
roscientists study not real humans but surrogate humans,
nonhuman species that we believe are similar enough to
humans to be informative about the human condition,
but not so similar as to be ethically problematic (or at
least not prohibitively so). This approach–the model-ani-
mal paradigm–has been widely employed in the experi-
mental biomedical sciences, particularly, in preference to
the broader, comparative approach that has flourished in
some other biological disciplines.
The adoption of the model-animal paradigm brought
about important changes in the way scientists understand
the role of animals in research [43-46]. In the early part of
the 20th century, before the establishment of currently
favored model-animal species such as rats, mice, and rhe-
sus monkeys, experimental biologists sought to identify
features of biological organization that are shared by a
wide variety of species. To identify these features, it was
felt necessary to actually compare a wide variety of species.
Attitudes changed as the favored model animals became
entrenched as research resources: increasingly it was
assumed that the experimentally identified characteristics
of these species have broad generality and the imperative
to empirically demonstrate generality faded. As historians
of science have observed, the establishment of breeding
colonies of rodents transformed these animals from sub-
jects of research into something more like standardized
chemical reagents [43,44,47]. From this perspective,
cross-species variation in biological organization is a
problem, a potential threat to the standing of one's partic-
ular model animal within the larger research community.
Species differences, if they are acknowledged at all, tend to
be soft-peddled and relegated to the status of noise: it's the
commonalities that matter. In this context, the word
"basic" has come to mean "common" or "widely shared."
As a result, "basic" keeps close company with "same," so
that one often hears the expression "the same basic X,"
where X can be structure, function, organization, or any
other attribute of organisms.
This analysis does not imply that the use of nonhuman
species as research models of human biological systems or
specific diseases is misguided; after all, humans do share
many features in common with other animals. What is
problematic is the mindset fostered by the model-animal
paradigm: viewing the biological world primarily through
this lens has serious and negative consequences for the
scientific enterprise. For one thing, because the model-
animal paradigm discourages systematic, rigorous treat-
ment of the similarities and differences across species, we
remain in the position of assuming generality, rather than
demonstrating it empirically. This is a particular problem
for the neurosciences–mammalian cerebral cortex, for
example, has proven to be far more variable across species
than believed a decade or two ago, fundamentally com-
promising the idea that there is a "basic uniformity" of
cortical design [48-51]. In addition, by failing to take dif-
ferences seriously, we have largely ignored the correlated
variations between biological organization and function
produced by evolution, and in so doing have ignored a
very rich source of information about structure-function
relationships (for examples of how such variations can be
exploited, see [52,53]). Finally, the model-animal para-
digm has little room for human specializations, for if we
consider to be "basic" only those characteristics of biolog-
ical organization that are shared among species, then the
features that distinguish human brains from those of
other species don't count as "basic." These would include
some of the most interesting and important things we
would like to know about human beings, such as what
features of our brains support our distinctive cognitive
capacities and what features render humans (alone
among primates) vulnerable to Alzheimer's disease
[54,55].
Making room for humans: the critical need for 
human-chimpanzee comparisons
We can begin to redress some of the deficiencies in our sci-
entific knowledge stemming from the primacy of the
model-animal paradigm, with its very indirect approach
to understanding human nature, by investing more in
comparative studies. The time is especially propitious for
studies that address human specializations through direct
comparisons of humans and closely related species,
because new techniques are available that make it possi-
ble to directly study the human brain in great detail, and
in ethically acceptable ways, and we can apply these same
techniques to the study of our closest relatives.
As the spatial resolution of neuroimaging techniques has
improved, it has become practical to use them to compare
the structure and function of human brains to those of
other primates. While comparisons with macaque mon-
keys–the favored model nonhuman primates–have been
emphasized [56-59], these approaches can be applied toJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:17 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/17
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the study of chimpanzees and other ape species as well
[60,61], opening the door to new explorations of human-
specific brain organization. In addition, histological stud-
ies of humans, using tissue obtained postmortem, have
undergone something of a rebirth, driven in part by the
need to provide a better understanding of the regional
organization of human cortex for the correct interpreta-
tion of functional imaging results than can be obtained
from the hundred-year-old cortical map of Brodmann
[62]. It is clear that one can obtain reliable and informa-
tive results with postmortem tissue derived not only from
humans, as well as from apes and other nonhuman pri-
mates (e.g., [34-36,63,64]).
The growth of knowledge about the genomic organization
of humans and nonhuman primates, including chimpan-
zees, creates additional opportunities for understanding
human-specific brain organization. A number of studies
have identified gene-expression or gene-sequence differ-
ences between humans, chimpanzees, and other nonhu-
man primates (reviewed in [65-67]). Large-scale genomic
changes in human evolution have also been documented,
involving duplications and rearrangements of DNA,
which in some cases have even resulted in the creation of
novel, human-specific genes (e.g., [68-70]).
Comparative genomics research on human-ape differ-
ences has generated enormous interest in the popular
media, which is not surprising given the strong interest of
the public in understanding what makes us human. One
important point that is not widely appreciated, however,
is that the identification of genetic differences that distin-
guish humans from other animals is ultimately of little
value if we cannot connect the genetic differences to phe-
notypic differences [71,72]. At the present time, the
wealth of information about human-chimpanzee genetic
differences stands in stark contrast to the poverty of our
understanding of human-chimpanzee differences in brain
organization. My colleagues and I have suggested that we
can use the information from comparative genetic studies
as clues to identify previously unknown phenotypic spe-
cializations of the human brain, for example, by follow-
ing the trail from genes to mRNA and protein expression
in tissue [66,73]. While we have focused on comparative
histological studies, genomics-driven "phenotype discov-
ery" could employ any of the growing array of non-inva-
sive, non-terminal techniques (biochemical, proteomic,
imaging, behavioral) we have for comparing humans to
other animals.
Will there be chimpanzees to study?
The advent of technologies like genomics and neuroimag-
ing gives me hope that neuroscience can adopt a more
direct approach to the study of human nature and once
again deal with fundamental questions of the kind
addressed in Karl Pribram's lecture. My optimism is tem-
pered, however, by the knowledge that we might soon
lose a resource vital for this pursuit. Understanding what
makes our brain distinctively human requires comparing
humans to chimpanzees, our closest relatives. In a world
where the value of animals in research is measured mainly
in terms of their utility as "models," chimpanzees don't fit
in very well, as they are more expensive and difficult to
maintain than, say, rodents, and as with humans, their use
in invasive research is restricted. So, despite the obvious
value of comparative studies of chimpanzees and humans
for understanding the human brain (including its distinc-
tive vulnerability to neurodegenerative disease), and
despite the availability of powerful new techniques for
comparing human and chimpanzee brains, it may soon
become impossible to pursue this essential research. In
1997, faced with a larger population of captive chimpan-
zees than could reasonably be supported, NIH imposed a
moratorium on breeding chimpanzees. Consequently, the
population is not being replaced as animals die of old age
and the number of chimpanzees available for the kind of
non-invasive research described above–the kind of
research we conduct with humans–is rapidly shrinking.
Given the highly endangered status of chimpanzees,
which seem destined for extinction in the wild within a
few decades, it is unlikely that such a resource, once lost,
would be reconstituted. In 2007, NIH will decide whether
or not to lift the moratorium. As someone committed to
understanding the structure, function, and diseases of the
human nervous system, I hope the moratorium will be
ended. It seems prudent, now that the population has
been reduced, to allow enough breeding to maintain a
viable population. To be sure, it would be simpler to con-
tinue the current policy, avoiding the political heat that
would result from choosing to maintain the chimpanzee
population, and instead devote our limited resources to
supporting mice and a few other favored model-animal
species. But, after all, the mouse we will always have with
us, whereas chimpanzees will be with us for only a short
time longer, if we continue on our current course. If we
fail to preserve the means to understand what makes us
human, in health and in disease, future generations will
surely ask: What were they thinking?
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